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Abstract 
The paper discusses the usefulness of the concept of empire in the study of the European Union, the 
integration process and the development EU’s external relations. In order to do so, it reflects critically 
on the use of this concept in the broader context of contemporary polities and selected European 
empires of the past. The paper argues that colonial empires are just one type of empires and that 
another type should be given more scholarly attention. In order to account for the diversity of imperial 
patterns observed, the paper suggests using two concepts, inwards imperial governance and outwards 
imperial governance. Using these two concepts instead of one undifferentiated concept of empire 
makes it possible to shed a different light on the EU’s alleged empirehood and its evolution over time. 
It also offers an analytical tool that can account for differences between different empires of the past 
as well as between contemporary candidates for empirehood and past empires. 
Keywords 
European Union, empire, imperial governance, imperial borders. 
 
 1 
Introduction1 
In a Westphalian world, we are used to thinking of states as political units delineated by borders, 
which fulfil a triple function (Del Sarto, 2010); borders delineate the territory of states, the 
geographical extent of their public authority, and their population. There are many reasons to say that 
this definition does not completely reflect today’s empirical reality, especially because of the 
emergence of supranational, transnational, or international systems of governance, but this is 
nonetheless the definition with which we function when we think of states and their borders. It is as if 
borders, thus defined, were inescapably tied to the concept of the modern Western Westphalian state. 
Borders appear as elements that contribute to define statehood and as elements that reveal it. Full-
blown states manage to have their borders in all three dimensions respected, among others, because 
their public authority is strong and legitimate enough to be respected inside their borders by their own 
citizens and outside by other states. Conversely, political units that are labelled “failed states” (Gros, 
1996), “quasi-states” (Jackson, 1990), or “weak states” (Sørensen, 2001) see their borders in all three 
dimensions challenged from within or from without. The crisis that has shaken Ukraine since the 
autumn of 2013 leading to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia in the spring of 2014 is 
a very good example. One can further argue that the vision of the Western state with thick, tight, and 
congruent borders (the three dimensions overlap more or less perfectly) is seriously challenged by the 
development of the European Union (Del Sarto, 2010), where member states freely opened their 
borders and surrendered part of their sovereignty. One could certainly contend that these definitions of 
state and borders might have never really been implemented in the first place, not even in the French 
state, often presented as the archetype of the modern nation-state, henceforth with “perfect” borders, 
but some groups have challenged up to now their full belonging to the French nation or state (for 
instance, the Corsican and Basque movements for independence or a few special regulations in Alsace 
and Lorraine where traditional French statehood has been adapted here and there to fit local 
particularities). But we should not conflate the analytical categories “border” and “state,” on the one 
hand, and the cases to which they apply, on the other; “border,” as defined earlier, is still a working 
category for many observers and legal and political actors. This leads to the generally admitted 
statements that a state (1) should govern within its borders and (2) should not govern beyond its 
borders. Consequently, states governing outside their borders raise the issue of interference in 
domestic affairs of another state. They are sometimes deemed imperialist, a term which marks a 
potential major difference between states and empires. States would govern within their borders while 
empires would govern outside their borders. Here again, the Ukraine crisis offers a very good 
illustration of this; most Western media agree on explaining that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 
policy towards Ukraine is best explained by his will to revive the Russian Empire (Jégo, 2014; Trenin, 
2014; Hille, 2014; Smimova, 2014). But does this really set apart states from empires? 
Focussing on empires, since this is the topic of this working paper, and in particular on European 
empires, I have considered imperial borders from the viewpoint of their function as delineators of 
imperial territories so as to shed light on some assumptions underpinning the scholarly literature that 
uses the concept of empire to analyse contemporary polities. This proved useful to reveal two distinct 
understandings of the concept of empire and, consequently, two distinct possible uses of this concept 
when applied to contemporary cases. However, while they seem to apply well to different historical 
examples of European empires, one of them largely dominates the scholarly debate. The other one 
remains neglected, probably because of a lack of detailed historical knowledge on empires. Further, 
with the exception of some very few scholars, who seem aware of the fact that there are different types 
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of empires (Nexon, 2009; Antonescu, 2008; Zielonka, 2006; Wæver, 1997), the scholarly literature 
uses the concept of empire as if it were an undifferentiated category. There is a noteworthy difference 
between studies on states, which operate with various typologies,
2
 and studies on empires, which most 
often use the concept of empire and limit their analyses to the discussion of its historical cases instead 
of exploring the possibilities of its subcategories. The ambition of this paper is to unpack a particular 
aspect of empires by shedding light on two imperial modes of governance—outwards imperial 
governance and inwards imperial governance.
3
 These are not mutually exclusive but complementary 
categories. In other words, empires can operate predominantly according to one of these modes, 
combine both at a time and, of course, evolve over time. From this point of view, first, the aim of this 
working paper is to provide scholars of European politics and of international relations conceptual 
tools that analyse some of the transformations that the European Community/European Union 
(EC/EU), as a contemporary candidate for empirehood, has undergone since its creation, especially 
taking into account its external relations. More precisely, these tools help identify three successive 
phases both in European integration history and in the development of the EC/EU’s external relations, 
which would not be visible otherwise. Second, this paper aims to offer conceptual tools explaining 
why seemingly different contemporary polities can be analysed through the lens of “empire.” The 
paper will conclude by suggesting how distinguishing two different modes of imperial governance 
could provide useful tools to analyse other contemporary candidates for empirehood. 
Empires Governing Outwards 
There are probably three elements of the definition of empires on which all scholars of empire agree, 
the first being asymmetry between the imperial core and its peripheries, and the second being 
territorial expansion. This second feature sets empires apart from the modern nation state, which have 
fixed borders—maybe not always so in the empirical world but certainly at the level of the analytical 
category “state.” States do not expand or shrink. Empires do. Münkler (2005) adds that empires must 
have experienced the full cycle of expansion, shrinkage, and reexpansion to be considered empires. 
We do not need to follow Münkler on this last aspect, but territorial expansion is seen by all as a major 
element characterising empires. Territorial expansion means moving borders. This is very different 
from having no borders. Imperial borders exist, but they are not considered fixed; empires are always 
likely to claim additional territories (territorial expansion if the empire succeeds in its attempt), while 
their challengers (from the inside or the outside) are likely to claim their territories back (imperial 
shrinkage, if the challengers succeed in their attempt). Once borders have stabilised again, newly 
absorbed territories become subject to imperial rule, while lost territories no longer need to apply the 
empire’s laws. Finally and maybe most importantly, the fact that borders move over time does not 
affect negatively the imperial quality of empires. On the contrary, it confirms their empirehood. 
Conversely, a state that is not able to protect its borders over time would be considered a weak state. 
But what about a state that reaches outside its borders? Would it still be a state or would it be an 
empire? Let us first introduce the third element of the definition of empires before answering this 
question. 
The third element on which scholars agree is that empires have peripheries, which means territories 
that they control, dominate, etc. (Motyl, 2001; Doyle, 1986; Wallerstein, 1974). This element is tightly 
linked to the first two: territorial expansion or shrinkage impact on the amount of peripheral territory 
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 Such as democratic/authoritarian/totalitarian states, “normal” states/quasi-states/weak states/failed states, 
unitary/composite states, etc. 
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 Inwards and outwards imperial governance are therefore understood as subcategories within a typology of empires. 
Choosing to develop subcategories of empire implies that the analysis of this working paper is situated at a subordinate 
level of empire. Consequently and for the sake of analytical coherence, it will neither discuss analytical categories 
situated at the superordinate level, i.e., the level of the category empire, such as hegemony, nor analytical categories that 
belong to other typologies, such as external governance, which is a subtype within a typology of governance. 
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under the control of the empire. And control exerted by the core over the peripheries is what 
characterises imperial asymmetry between core and peripheries. Thus, a combination of these three 
elements would allow the conclusion that in the presence of a state having the capacity to govern 
outside its borders into the territories of other units, we have an empire. According to Doyle (1986, 
45), “empire (...) is a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political 
sovereignty of another political society.” Translated into Motyl’s structural theory of empire, this 
refers to the characteristic structure of empires—a “hublike structure” or a “rimless wheel” (2001, 4). 
In other words, an empire is made of a core and peripheries that interact with the imperial core but not 
(or hardly) among themselves, since they are no longer independent units. While Motyl’s structural 
theory grasps the structure of the empire, Doyle’s approach focusses on the power relation, but both 
converge towards a relation where a core governs outside its territory and inside the territory of several 
other units. As opposed to Motyl who uses the notion of “core,” Doyle uses the notion of “state” in his 
definition. We will see later in this paper that although such viewpoint reflects the common 
understanding of empire, it is partly disproved by historical facts. 
The three above-mentioned defining elements are very much present in contemporary literature 
using the concept of empire to analyse present-day polities. Many present the USA as a good 
illustration of a contemporary empire. Some other examples include China and Russia, but the USA is 
probably the most systematically analysed. A closer look shows that it is not the USA as a whole that 
is being scrutinised and considered a contemporary case of empire but its foreign policy. This 
understanding of empire is derived from the latest form of European empires—colonial empires. In 
contrast to present-day so-called empires, everybody agreed on labelling colonial empires (like their 
predecessors) as empires. On the contrary, contemporary “empires” do not consider themselves 
empires. It is worth noting again a difference in the scholarly attitude towards the concepts of 
“empire” and “state.” While scholars try to impose the label “empire” to contemporary polities, they 
never try to impose the label “state” to contemporary polities. The opposite seems to occur; concepts 
of “failed states” and the like try to withdraw the quality of states to units judged unworthy of this 
label. Conversely, because of the refusal of contemporary polities to accept the label “empire,” 
scholars have coined and used the notions of “empire in denial” (Chandler, 2006; Fergusson, 2002) 
and “accidental empire” (Gorenberg, 2006). It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse more in 
detail these two scholarly attitudes. But it seems that there is something at stake, possibly normative, 
when scholars use the concepts of “state” and “empire,” which in turn makes the scientific use of these 
concepts more delicate. 
Colonial empires greatly correspond to Doyle’s definition of empire. Indeed, they all had in 
common a state at their core, which extended its political reach to other territories, most if not all 
being overseas. In these cases, “empire” designated territories outside the borders of the core state 
under its control—in other words, the peripheries. This is what Charles Maier (2006) has described as 
having an empire—the French state had an empire, the British state had an empire, etc. When scholars 
speak of the USA as an empire, it is with this understanding of empire in mind: the USA would be the 
core-state, and its empire (or its peripheries) would stretch to the rest of the world, including the EU 
(Zielonka, 2011). Some consider the USA an empire because it has an empire, because it has the 
capacity to impact governance in territories situated outside its borders. When scholars analyse the 
USA, the implicit concept of empire they use corresponds to their conceptualisation of colonial 
empires. More generally, when contemporary scholars of international relations and European politics 
(but not historians) think of empires, with some few exceptions, they have this model of empire in 
mind. Therefore, they benchmark present-day polities and past empires to this concept. Even those 
who consider the Roman Empire analyse it through the lens of colonial empires, while disregarding at 
the same time aspects that do not correspond to this imperial pattern. As a result, contemporary 
polities or past empires that do not correspond to this model are considered weak empires at the most 
if not something else than an “empire,” hence Voltaire’s notorious pun, according to which the Holy 
Roman Empire was “neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire” (1756). Voltaire may have been right. 
But maybe his judgement merely reflects the fact that he benchmarked this empire against an 
Magali Gravier 
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inappropriate and, in a way, anachronistic analytical category.
4
 In a nutshell, I am arguing, first, that 
colonial empires are just one type of empires and, second, that scholarly literature (of IR and European 
Studies) focusses predominantly on outwards imperial governance. Let us now turn our attention 
towards another type of imperial governance, inwards imperial governance. 
Empires Governing Inwards 
Scholars of empire who use the concept of empire in the case of the EU and the USA all note that 
“empire” does not refer to the same phenomenon in these two cases (Zielonka, 2011; Parker, 2011; 
Colomer, 2007). At one level, this is because the two polities are indeed different. But I would also 
like to suggest that when scholars use the concept of empire in both cases, they do not use it in the 
same way; wherefore, they do not look at the same imperial features or aspects. Approaches to EU 
empirehood have also evolved over time. 
Looking at contemporary USA, it seems easy to contend that it is a state that has peripheries 
outside its borders. Conversely, in the first groundbreaking book that looked at the EU as an empire 
(Zielonka, 2006), territories considered peripheries were not states outside the borders of the EU but 
states that had just been accepted inside its borders. The historian Dominic Lieven (2002) observed in 
his book Empire that the founding member states of the EU more or less reproduced the composition 
of the Carolingian Empire. In his book Europe as Empire (2006), Jan Zielonka noted that the 2004 
enlargement marked a turning point it the EU’s trajectory, which transformed the EU into an empire. 
What was new in the EU after 2004 was the asymmetry between older and newer member states,
5 
which is, as seen earlier, a defining characteristic of empires. A closer look shows that the concept of 
empire in this case was used not to look at territories outside the borders of the imperial core but to 
look inside the borders of the would-be empire and to pinpoint a particular relation between the 
elements incorporated within these borders (see figures 1 and 2). Going back to Maier’s (2006) 
phrasing, Zielonka saw the EU as being an empire. In summary, the USA’s would-be empire would be 
a matter of foreign policy while the EU’s would-be empire would be a matter of domestic politics. The 
USA would have an empire, whereas the EU would be an empire. 
Bringing history back in, the way we look at the EU corresponds to another type of empire, which 
some scholars reluctantly call an empire since it does not correspond to the empires they have in mind 
when they think of the concept of empire. Among scholars of political science/international relations, 
only a few allow for a diversity of categories (not cases) of empires (Nexon, 2009; Zielonka, 2013, 
2006, 2001; Wæver, 1997), but I do not think they make the most of the types of empires they mention 
because they do not delve deep enough in the analysis of their rationales of governance. I will argue 
that, given their systems of internal governance, European empires prior to colonial empires are in 
many respects very close to the EU, at least in its early phase. It is not that they were “empires by 
land”—a notion that is descriptive and does not work well since, in reality, many empires were both 
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 Voltaire (1694–1778) was a contemporary of the Holy Roman Empire. He was born and died before the dissolution of 
this empire in 1806. But while Voltaire was a man of the Enlightenment, a man of his time, the Holy Roman Empire was 
the heir of an epoch long gone; it was created in the Middle Ages and, owing to the doctrine of the translatio imperii, 
claimed to be the descendant of an empire of the ancient times (Rome). Voltaire and the Holy Roman Empire belonged to 
different worlds and “spoke” incompatible political languages. 
5
 The unprecedented degree of asymmetry between member states that joined the union in 2004 and 2007 and the rest of 
the union can be illustrated, for instance, by the following two measures. First and against the four fundamental freedoms 
posed in the Treaty of Rome, the EU introduced measures restricting the freedom of circulation of labour force towards 
the older member states. The measures were of course temporary, but this had never been done for the previous 
enlargements. Second, on the very day of the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, the European Commission activated 
what it called the “cooperation and verification mechanism,” which was meant to monitor Romania’s and Bulgaria’s 
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by land and by sea. The differences lie elsewhere. Initially, as opposed to Doyle’s definition, 
preseventeenth/eighteenth century empires did not have a state at their core but a city (e.g., Rome or 
Byzantium) or a dynasty (e.g., Ottonian, Staufer, or Habsburg). My hypothesis at this point is that this 
is a fundamental difference that explains the two distinct rationales of governance. 
Magali Gravier 
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Figure 1. Imperial outwards governance. Governance from the core into the peripheries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Imperial inwards governance. Governance remains inside the borders of the empire 
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Colonial empires had territorial Westphalian states at their core. For this generation of European 
states, external borders were a “thick line” separating an “inside,” over which ruled a sovereign 
European state, from an “outside,” over which ruled another European state or an “outside” made of 
territories not belonging to a European state and therefore potentially available for annexation. The 
external borders of the core state were thus the main mental frontier, and the empire lay beyond them. 
Earlier empires did not share this vision of borders because their core was of a different nature. Cores 
were either dynasties (nonterritorial entities) or cities (microterritories with “hinterland”). For these 
earlier empires, the mental frontier separating the inside from the outside could not be that of the core; 
it was the external border of the empire or the “limes.” Further, even if inwards governing empires had 
overseas or discontinuous territories, a significant part of their territories were contiguous. This may 
explain that they did not systematically govern the populations of their peripheries so dramatically 
differently than the core population, contrary to colonial empires, which experienced major 
discrepancies between the system of governance within the borders of the core state (many of which 
actually counted among the first modern democracies, e.g., the United Kingdom or France) and the 
ones at play within their colonies (which were often very brutal and undemocratic, e.g., Belgian 
colonial rule in Congo or British colonial rule in its “nonwhite” colonies, such as India, South Africa, 
Sudan, and Kenya). In short, the structure and governance of these earlier European empires was 
different from that of later colonial empires. 
Like early European empires, the EU does not have a state at its core. In a way, its core is located 
in three cities (Brussels, Strasbourg, and Luxembourg), but it is probably better to say that its core is 
an institutional stratum (Gravier, 2009) rather than a geographical place. If we focus on the early 
phase of the EC/EU, we should compare it to the Holy Roman Empire (HRE). There are several 
reasons for using this empire as a case for comparison. The HRE never had a fixed capital. This comes 
close to the situation of the EU, which doesn’t have an official capital, although, in a way, we can say 
that it has three “functional” capitals (Brussels, Strasbourg, and Luxembourg); the concentration of 
power and authority in a particular institution or set of institutions (such as the Holy Roman Emperor, 
the Imperial Diet or the European Commission, the European Council, and the European Parliament) 
is decisive not on the geographical centralisation of imperial power in a city. Further, there was no 
imperial army in the HRE. The emperor had to use his own military capacity (i.e., as king of one or 
several territories of the empire) and negotiate military participation more or less successfully with 
other members of the empire. We are not far from the situation in the EU, where, despite slow 
evolutions towards a common military force, it is still unrealistic to speak of an EU army. Despite its 
name, the Eurocorps is not the EU’s army. Military impulses still come from the few member states 
that have an international military capacity (essentially France and the United Kingdom since 
Germany most often chooses to refrain from such a responsibility for historical reasons). Importantly, 
by contrast with the EU, the elected emperor of the HRE was not almighty. His powers, rights, and 
prerogatives were negotiated during the electoral process between him and the prince-electors. From 
the sixteenth century onwards, they were put in writing in a document called capitulatio. This reminds 
of the EU of its lack of “competence of its competences” because of the principle of conferral,6 which 
constrains the exercise of the EU’s power to the powers conferred to it by its member states. Such 
comparisons between the HRE and the EU could be multiplied, but the most important aspect lies, in 
my opinion, elsewhere. It lies in the rationale of these two polities. 
As opposed to colonial empires, where the core state is “extrovert” in its governance, an empire 
like the HRE and a polity like the early EC/EU are so to speak “introvert” empires or polities. The 
Schuman declaration clearly states that the reasons for starting the integration process were (1) to 
prevent war on the European continent by pooling strategic military industries (coal and steel) and 
putting them under a common supranational authority and (2) to bring wealth back on the European 
continent. At its time, the Holy Roman Empire did something similar. Looking back at the impact of 
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the HRE, there was a fairly successful experiment, which brought scattered and belligerent lords, as 
well as ecclesiastical territories, under a common institutional roof during nine centuries. It is also the 
ancestor of Europe’s biggest full-blown state, Germany. Its first centuries were mainly dedicated to the 
establishment of more or less peaceful relations within the imperial territory. This was done through 
particular legal instruments. The movements of Landfrieden and Reichslandfrieden, which emerged 
around the eleventh/twelfth century from the movement of the Peace and Truce of God, were 
“contracts” aiming to forbid the use of private violence to settle conflicts by imposing the use of legal 
solutions. These documents protected people, objects, and buildings. A particular branch of law, as 
well as a particular kind of tribunals (Landfriedensgerichte), was created to settle conflicts. The 
Landfrieden and Reichslandfrieden progressively forbade the use of private violence, and in doing so, 
they contributed to the differentiation of a centre and its monopolisation of coercion. The 
Sachsenspiegel, in the early thirteenth century, was a major volume of medieval law, which among 
other things regulated relations between estates, the election of the emperors and kings, and feudal 
relations. Taken as a whole, the HRE had a fairly sophisticated but at the same time very complicated 
legal system
7
 because of the multiplicity of legal statuses of each component of the empire (states, 
churches, free cities, etc.). At the top of this legal construct stood the emperor (Buschmann, 1993). 
All these elements point to that which held this empire together during nine centuries despite its 
alleged weakness. The Holy Roman Empire did not hold because of coercion exerted by the emperor 
over subdued territories but held because the subjects were attached to their emperor and to their 
empire as a legal order. The emperor was not the generalissimo of the HRE but its highest judge 
(Roellecke, 1993). The most fundamental mission of the emperor was to maintain law and peace 
(Roellecke, 1993). Further, even though the concept makes little sense in today’s Bodinian world,8 
“regional sovereignty” (Landesherrschaft) was a key notion of the constitution of this empire (Haldén, 
2011). The Reich itself and its institutions were of utmost significance for smaller states, which is the 
reason they were attached to the empire; the imperial constitution protected smaller lords against 
ambitious and powerful ones (Raap, 2004). These aspects remind of the original mission of the EC/EU 
as a peacekeeping and wealth-bringing experiment in post–World War II Europe and of the strong 
political signal given to smaller member states, which were granted overrepresentation in all 
institutions, even in the bureaucratic apparatus. Granting them more say in governing matters than 
they would have had on mere demographic criteria was a way of protecting their existence. The 
original mission of the EC/EU was fulfilled not with the use of force, since this was precisely what 
was to be banned (once more) on the European continent, but with the use of treaties and other legal 
norms, progressively combined with an explicit economic strategy (which does not seem to have been 
at play in the HRE). Both polities pursued a goal of regional pacification and protection within their 
borders. Theorising bottom up from these two examples, empires governing inwards, first, really 
govern inwards (implying common institutions, norms, etc.) and, second, do not primarily seek to 
subdue “the world” by crushing it through their might; they seek to pacify a region of the world by 
other means than just coercive ones (e.g., legal or economic). In a way, it is a process of civilisation 
(Elias 1973). 
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 Given the longevity of the empire, such a statement does not make much sense. In the first centuries, the HRE’s legal 
system and institutions did not compare at all with its contemporary challenger, the Byzantine Empire, which had an 
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 We owe the French philosopher of the state Jean Bodin (1529–1596) the notion of state sovereignty, in other words, the 
indivisible and supreme power of the state (Beaud, 2007). 
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The difference between inwards and outwards imperial governance is reflected in the fact that 
empires governing outwards or “colonial empires” did not need and did not wish to even remotely 
treat the peripheral territories as equals. Conversely, empires governing inwards were ready to treat 
more equally or at least more fairly some of the territories or populations located inside their borders. 
As a result, these territories or populations were somehow associated with the functioning of central 
institutions. (They took part in electoral processes; they provided the core with political, military, or 
administrative elite; they lent money to the emperor; they sometimes even provide the next emperor, 
etc.) This also means that such empires had a strong integration capacity at the regional level. The 
early EC/EU corresponds significantly to this pattern: a political system trying to govern, with the help 
of a common political and legal order, different states, which previously considered themselves 
enemies. Although there is no perfect equivalent of the imperial function in the EU, the heads of the 
European institutions are assigned to member states according to different systems of allocation 
(rotation or political negotiation). States that were once considered part of the semiperiphery of the 
EC/EU, such as “Portugal, Spain (…) and Greece; most of Eastern Europe; (…) Finland” (Wallerstein, 
1976), have become full members of the EU. Even if there are big de facto inequalities between the 
twenty-eight member states (which constitutes “asymmetry”—a defining characteristic of empires), 
they all take part in the collective process of governance. Thus, although the Greek state was put, for 
better or for worse, under economic tutelage by the bigger member states in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, it took over the rotating presidency of the council on 8 January 2014. 
Empires governing outwards and inwards are analytical categories that are not mutually exclusive 
because they focus on different imperial structures, institutions, and rationales. This implies that 
empirical cases do not necessarily fit perfectly in any category; they may present aspects of both 
categories or move from one category to the other over time (see table 1). In the contemporary 
context, the USA presents patterns that fit seemingly well in the category of outwards imperial 
governance. Conversely, the case of the EU is more complicated to deal with. For the early phase of 
integration, as I have argued in this section, the EC/EU developed essentially following a rationale that 
corresponds to inwards imperial governance. From this viewpoint, it presents many parallels with the 
Holy Roman Empire. But a broader look, including the more recent period, reveals a more complex 
picture, which has evolved over time, especially since the 2000s. Indeed, a qualitative shift occurred in 
the integration process through the 2004 enlargement, the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, and the 
dismantling of the West European Union. Many observers agree with the fact that EU’s capacity to act 
and influence outwards has greatly increased even if the EU is still criticised for its weakness in 
comparison to powerful states, such as the USA, Russia, or China. The last section of this paper will 
be dedicated to this evolution and to understanding what it means in terms of EU empirehood.  
Table 1: Types of imperial governance 
 Type I Type II Types I and II combined 
Types of 
imperial 
governance 
Inwards imperial 
governance 
Outwards imperial 
governance 
Combined 
simultaneously 
Combined over 
time 
Example 
Holy Roman 
Empire 
Colonial empires 
(e.g., British Empire 
and French Empire) 
Byzantine Empire 
Roman Empire 
(From type II to 
type I) 
Is the EU an Empire Governing Inwards and Outwards? 
Looking back to the Schuman declaration and to the first community to which it led, the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the initial purpose of European integration was directed 
“inwards.” Much of Europe had been destroyed by World War II; Europe needed to take care of itself. 
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The ECSC was an instrument tailored for this purpose. Later, the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) contributed to the same goal. Of course, 
external concerns were present, especially when the EEC was created, and with it the Common 
Market, as well as the Customs Union, not the least because of the then colonies of the European 
member states (e.g., France and Belgium) and those of the United Kingdom, if it were one day to 
become a member state (Balogh, 1962). But even these instruments that evidently affected Europe’s 
international trade were primarily meant to have an impact on the relations between member states.
9 
As the EC/EU experiment increasingly stabilised the European continent and brought wealth and 
peace to its peoples, the EC/EU started developing tools for external action; later, it was even asked to 
perform such actions and was mocked when it failed to do so.
10
 Some tools had been there since the 
beginning, such as the common commercial policy; others, like the neighbourhood policy or the 
European External Action Service, came decades later. As was the case for its internal dimensions, the 
EU did not develop homogeneously in its external dimensions. For instance, although the EU’s 
defence and diplomatic capacities have been enhanced, especially since the Treaty of Lisbon, they are 
still limited in some aspects, reminding the observer that the EC/EU was not designed for external, let 
alone military, action. Developing a strong defence and military capacity similar to those of states or 
empires would require a substantial transformation of the EU and of its project, which would in any 
case be a very long process if it ever were to be fulfilled. But in political and economic aspects, the EU 
has already developed a strong capacity for action. This has already been documented and theorised 
under the label “normative power” (Manners, 2002) in various contexts (e.g., death penalty and 
relations with WTO) (Manners, 2002; Ladefoged, 2008) and imported in the study of the EU as an 
empire under the label of “normative empire” (Del Sarto, 2015). An increasing number of scholars 
have started documenting the EU’s intention to influence the countries of its borderlands, especially 
the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries covered by the neighbourhood policy (Del 
Sarto, 2014), as well as countries situated farther away, like the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) 
countries (Sepos, 2013). Of course, intention does not necessarily mean success (Del Sarto, 2014), but 
the desire to affect territories situated outside of one’s borders and concrete attempts to do so are early 
signals of outwards governance. 
In terms of imperial governance, we observe an evolution of the EC/EU, which can be divided in 
three main phases. These phases do not correspond to types of imperial governance, which replaced 
one another, but to layers of imperial governance, which were added on top of one another as the 
EC/EU gained in governance capacity. In the initial phase, the EC/EU mainly dealt with the “shadows 
of its empires” (Muller, 2001), in other words, with the empires of its member states that existed 
formally when the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC) was signed. To 
the contemporary observers of the EEC’s first steps, France’s successful “last minute” request to 
include in the TEEC provisions allowing the association to the Customs Union of “those areas which 
[had] at about the time of the conclusion of the treaty some sort of political connection with any of the 
members, irrespective of their later being granted full independence” (Balogh, 1962, 87) appeared as 
“a means of perpetuating colonial rule” (Balogh, 1962, 79). So the notions of empire and of colonial 
territories were present both in the minds of the decision makers and in the Treaty of Rome but not as 
a dimension of the EC/EU. Those were the (former) empires and (former) colonies of the member 
states. They were attributes of these states, and as such, they were dragged along into the European 
integration process, as it were, independently of the process itself. In this respect, if we were to speak 
of imperial governance in the context of the early European integration process, it would be situated 
                                                     
9
 This can be seen, for instance, in the fact that the Common Market and the Customs Union were presented in the early 
articles of the original Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC) (respectively articles 2 and 9), 
whereas the impact on world trade is mentioned much later in the treaty, in the chapter dedicated to the commercial 
policy (article 110: “By establishing a customs union between themselves Member states aim to contribute, in the 
common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade”). 
10
 Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens famously declared, “Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a 
military worm,” during the Gulf War in 1991. 
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not at the supranational but at the member state level. The EC/EU itself did not bear any imperial 
features yet; it was merely an international (or better, a regional) organisation. 
Following Ole Wæver (1997), the second phase possibly starts in the aftermath of the collapse of 
the Iron Curtain. While, in the first phase, the EC/EU deals with the remains of the empires of some of 
its member states, the EU itself is not conceptualised as an empire. Things change in the second phase, 
where the EU as a political system experiences a transformation, which leads scholars to start using 
the concept of empire to analyse the changing EU. With the USSR’s period of profound internal 
reform and the opening of the Iron Curtain, the states of Central Europe (Poland; Czechoslovakia, 
which rapidly split into Slovakia and the Czech Republic; Hungary; and Slovenia), some Eastern 
European states (Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, which also rapidly separated), and territories 
formerly annexed by the USSR (Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia) break off the zone of influence of the 
Russian imperial core. These former Soviet territories and peripheries rapidly turn towards the only 
strong core left on the European continent, the EC/EU, and ask to become members. Although, or 
maybe because, they are not member states yet, the mere prospect of membership confers upon the EU 
a bargaining position, which is strong enough to impose internal transformations on these countries. 
Wæver speaks here of empire. In other words, he uses the concept of empire (which he conceives of as 
a metaphor rather than a hard concept) to help conceptualise the relations between the EU and 
territories situated outside its borders. Because the EU is in a position to impose transformations on 
the political and economic systems of these countries, the concept of outwards imperial governance 
seems to apply quite well. 
A few years later, another important piece of literature conceptualises the EU as an empire. At first, 
Zielonka´s Europe as Empire seems to be “just” another analysis of the EU in terms of empire. 
Commentators note that Zielonka brings in medieval empires to account for the way the imperial core 
is conceptualised (no longer one single core but overlapping systems of rule). However, scholars 
overlook the fact that this book uses a different understanding of the concept of empire from the one 
usually used in political science and international relations and that the profound difference between 
medieval empires and later empires does not just lie in overlapping systems of rule. While Zielonka, 
like Wæver a few years before him, uses the concept of empire to analyse the relations between the 
EU and Central and Eastern European (CEE) states, between the two publications, these states have 
become member states of the EU. In other words, the concept of empire is no longer used as a means 
to conceptualise outwards imperial governance but to conceptualize inwards imperial governance. 
Indeed, as Zielonka notes, the 2004 enlargement brings with it a change in the internal functioning of 
the EU because, suddenly, the EU is no longer a club of equals but a polity marked by significant 
asymmetry among its components. The EU, temporarily occupied by territories outside its external 
borders, went back to what it was institutionally designed for, in other words, focussing on itself—
except that its “self” was now ten and then twelve states bigger. 
In the light of Zielonka’s analysis, we can reinterpret Wæver’s use of the concept of empire slightly 
differently. It is correct to pinpoint the EU’s capacity to contribute significantly to the transitions 
experienced by the CEE countries, and this seems to justify the use of the concept of outwards 
imperial governance. However, the EU could have this impact on CEE countries because the states in 
question were expected to join the EU. Therefore, these countries were already in an in-between 
situation where the political and economic transformations were meant to be not stand-alone reforms 
but preparatory stages for their incorporation into a bigger unit. The future member states needed to be 
sufficiently compatible with the EU’s political and economic system before incorporation. So while 
Wæver, who writes in 1997, has the impression of observing outwards imperial governance, for the 
observer writing after completion of the process, it seems more appropriate to speak of imperial 
incorporation. The process started in a mode similar to that of outwards imperial governance, but it 
was in fact the first step of inwards imperial governance applied to incoming members. In a way, 
inwards and outwards imperial governance are static concepts. Imperial incorporation, which can be 
defined as a process by which a territory switches from a state of being outside to a state of being 
Magali Gravier 
12 
inside the empire, describes a process of transformation. As all transformation processes, it does not fit 
well in “static” analytical categories, which are meant to conceptualise states of things and not 
processes leading from one state of things to another. 
Summarising the second phase, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Iron Curtain, the EU 
experienced territorial expansion—a typical imperial feature—in a way that was completely new to it. 
This was not just because of the unusually high number of new member states taken in but also 
because it brought in the EU a degree of internal asymmetry—another typical imperial feature—
among its member states, which had never existed before. Scholars started using the concept of empire 
precisely to analyse this new pattern in the European integration process. First, with phase 2, the EU 
started being analysed like an empire and its member states like its peripheries. Second, taking a closer 
look at the reasons why the EU was labelled an empire by a handful of scholars, the concept of 
inwards imperial governance seems to account best for the type of imperial governance at play. Using 
the analytical categories of Maier, with the 2004 enlargement, the EU would have become an empire. 
The third phase was triggered by the 2004 enlargement. As the EU prepared to take in twelve new 
member states, it realised that this would push back the new external borders much farther. Some of its 
new immediate neighbours would be very different from its previous ones, and to some extent, they 
would be much more instable. The EU’s response was a new policy area, the so-called European 
neighbourhood policy. It targeted countries that would come as close to the EU as possible without 
being granted membership. The idea was to create a stable belt of countries around the EU, which 
would share its values and be politically and economically compatible enough (Del Sarto & 
Schumacher, 2005). Financial help was granted for political and economic transformations (in other 
words, democratisation and the introduction of market economy). The tool of conditionality, well-
known in the world of international organisations, offered the EU necessary leverage to be able to 
influence the internal governance of targeted countries. 
The results are not as ambitious as expected by all actors involved. Ten years after the introduction 
of this policy studies on the southern neighbours of the EU, the MENA countries agree on the fact that 
the EU has somehow had a noticeable impact on the internal governance of some of these countries 
(Browning & Joenniemi, 2008) but not on all (Del Sarto, 2014). For instance, the case of Egypt shows 
that if the EU’s capacity of influence can be evidenced in the economic sector, its capacity to influence 
the Egyptian political framework is much more limited and has shifted over time (Roccu, 2015). In 
other cases the “normative empire” EU has had to adjust its ambitions (Del Sarto, 2015). Other authors 
also stress the EU’s capacity to influence in one way or another the internal life of countries situated in 
different regions of the world, such as the ACP countries (Sepos, 2013). 
All in all, authors use the concept of empire to characterise the EU’s more or less intentional and 
more or less efficient impact on MENA and ACP countries. However, as opposed to the pattern 
observed in phase 2, in phase 3, the concept of empire is used to describe and analyse the relations 
between the EU and countries that are outside its borders and will remain outside them. This is not the 
same type of imperial governance than in phase 2. This is (an attempt to exert) outwards imperial 
governance. The EU no longer acts like a medieval empire whose empirehood is characterised by a 
particular pattern of governance inside its borders but acts like a colonial empire whose empirehood is 
characterised by a particular pattern of governance outside the borders of its core polity. This means 
that, in phase 3, the EU appears to have two sets of peripheries, corresponding to the two types of 
imperial governance (see figure 3). Interestingly enough, the states that are mentioned in phase 3 are 
mostly the same as those in phase 1. However, in phase 3, they are no longer seen as peripheries of the 
empires of some EU member states but seen as current informal peripheries of the EU as an empire. It 
is as if the process of integration had been so efficient that by pooling some aspects of sovereignty at 
the supranational level, postimperial relations had also been pooled at the supranational level. For 
MENA and CEE countries, this shift was formalised by the creation of the ENP. For ACP countries, it 
was a more subtle and gradual shift, which became visible in phase 3 although, in a way, it is an 
unsurprising evolution from phase 1. In a nutshell, with phase 3, the EU has acquired an empire. 
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Figure 3. Inwards and outwards governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, inwards and outwards imperial governance are not conceived as mutually 
exclusive since they refer to different rationales of imperial governance. When considered separately, 
they seem to describe fairly convincingly two types of empires. But they can also be combined in one 
empire. In this respect, if we accept the heuristic use of the concept of empire in the case of the EU
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then it is possible to say that at some point in its evolution, (1) the EU started to develop imperial 
patterns, (2) those imperial patterns are sequential, and (3) they are not of an undifferentiated imperial 
kind but of two very different imperial kinds. One of these patterns (inwards imperial governance) 
appeared before the other (outwards imperial governance). But the latter (outwards imperial 
governance), at least as far as MENA and ACP countries are concerned, probably developed because 
it was the transformation of imperial relations that existed essentially between countries of the African 
continent and some European states into asymmetrical relations between the same countries and the 
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justify the use of this concept (Gravier, 2011).
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EU. This evolution clearly indicates the strengthening of the EU despite repeated criticism on the EU’s 
weakness in international relations. In turn, this apparent contradiction could result from the fact that, 
although the EU has developed a second layer of imperial governance (i.e., it would now be and have 
an empire), it remains marked by the first imperial pattern in terms of rationale and means of action. 
The EU was fundamentally meant to be an introvert polity. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that it is possible to distinguish two dimensions of imperial governance—
inwards and outwards imperial governance. I have also argued that if they characterise well two 
different types of empires, most contemporary scholars consider that empires are characterised by 
outwards governance. In doing so, they neglect inwards imperial governance and the possibility that 
an empire may mainly present the features of this type of imperial governance. Finally, I have argued 
that scholars of empire have not always used the concept of empire in a consistent way when 
analysing the EU. While the USA has consistently been observed and analysed through the lens of 
outwards imperial governance, the EU has presented itself as a blurred case. The concept of empire 
has been used to look inside and outside the borders of the EU. In the first case, member states of the 
EU constitute the periphery of the “EU Empire.” In the second case, the entire EU is implicitly 
considered as the core of another “EU Empire.” This second empire consists of a second set of 
peripheries, which are all external states. Some of them fall in the scope of the European 
neighbourhood policy, like Mediterranean states (e.g., Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, etc.) and East 
European states (e.g., Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, etc.); others lie even farther, like African and 
Caribbean states. Whichever way the EU is looked at, the implicit benchmark to assess the EU’s 
empirehood remains predominantly the colonial empire, in other words, outwards imperial 
governance. From this viewpoint, the slow development of the EU’s capacity of action outside its 
borders gives the impression that the EU is becoming an empire but of a soft kind (so maybe not full-
fledged) because of its lack of statehood and military capacity. 
Taking into account the two dimensions of imperial governance, the bigger picture looks slightly 
different. From this alternative viewpoint, the EU may not be so much developing empirehood as it is 
adding to a first type of empirehood (inwards imperial governance) another more familiar one 
(outwards imperial governance). In terms of historical examples, the EU is moving from an introvert 
empirehood à la Holy Roman Empire to a more balanced empirehood (both inwards and outwards) à 
la Byzantine Empire. What does this tell us about the future evolution of the EU? The use of the 
concepts of imperial governance opens two paths for projection. Scenario 1: The EU will develop the 
type of action characteristic of outwards governing empires. This implies developing its military 
capacity and a more violent mode of governance. This scenario seems unlikely in the near future 
because it would mean a substantial transformation of the EU. Scenario 2: The EU will continue to be 
marked by its original institutional purpose, which corresponds better to inwards imperial governance. 
This second path seems more likely, which would mean that the EU’s outwards imperial governance 
will remain a hybrid kind—outwards imperial governance by its territorial outreach but using means 
of governance characteristic of inwards imperial governance. This will repeatedly trigger criticism 
concerning an apparent incapacity of action, even though this “incapacity” is in fact the late result of 
an initial choice from member states for a different kind of action to regulate interstate relations—
negotiation and cooperation versus conflict and military power. 
The last question to be addressed in this conclusion concerns the added value of these two concepts 
of imperial governance for scholars of empire. In this article, the two concepts were applied to shed 
light on the evolution of the European integration process and the development of its external 
relations. This worked well because the Europolity presents complex imperial features combining both 
inwards and outwards imperial governance. As has been stressed, contemporary USA differs from the 
EU since it only presents features of outwards imperial governance. Distinguishing inwards from 
outwards imperial governance provides an explanation as to why both cases are analysed through the 
Stable Core, Shifting Periphery? 
15 
lens of empire although they present very different characteristics. Other candidates for contemporary 
empirehood, such as China and Russia, could also be analysed using the two concepts of imperial 
governance. Finally, from the viewpoint of theory, distinguishing two concepts of imperial 
governance, as was done in this paper, opens the path for a renewal of theories of empires. Such a 
renewal would make it possible to account for a broader palette of imperial experiences and to also 
link better theories of empire and theories of regional integration, especially considering the concept 
of inwards imperial governance. 
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